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... rationalism is an attitude of readiness to listen to
critical arguments and to fearn from experience. It is
fundamentalfy an attitude ofadmitting that "I mt!Y be
wrongandyou mt!Y be right, and l!J an effort, we mt!Yget
nearer the trnth."
KarlPopper
.. .philosophershave very littfe timefor discussion. Every
philosopherrnns awt!Y when he orshe hears someone st!Y,
('Let} discuss this."
Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari2
On the basis of these two quotations, one would imagine that
any conversation between Gilles Deleuze and I<arl Popper would be
destined to be a short one. The differences in approach they represent
are certainly reflected in their comments on each od1.er's ideas: to the
best of my knowledge there are none. Indeed, even in secondary sources
one would rarely expect to find their names referred to in the same
book, let alone on the same page. To put it more precisely, their
respective understandings and practices of philosophy appear so
incompatible as to preclude any "common territory" between them.
What they write about, how d1.ey write about it, and even who reads
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them seem to place them, and their ideas, in distinctly different philo-
sopbical milieus. There is, however, at least one point onwbich Deleuze
and Popper could be said to agree unequivocally: they both 'detest'3
and 'abhor'4 Hegel, and both posit a relation between Hegelian pbi-
losophyand totalising or even totalitarian political formations. Indeed,
in The Open Socie!J andIts Enemies, Popper explicitly argues that what he
calls 'irrationalist philosophy' in general (and Hegelianism in particu-
lar), has both a specific responsibility for the rise of fascism in Ger-
many, and for 20th century totalitarian political thought in general. He
takes this responsibility to be serious and substantial enough to de-
scribe bis analysis and critique of it as bis contribution to the Second
World War: "It should not be forgotten that I looked upon my book
[first published in 1945] as my war effort: believing as I did irL the
responsibility of Hegel and the Hegelians for much of what happened
in Germany."s However, the routes that Deleuze and Popper take to
reach these cOl1clusions about Hegel and Hegelianism are radically
divergent, to the point that, if one followed Popper's path, Deleuze
would appear not as the implacable enemy of Hegel he is often
presented as, but rather as one of the "inheritors" of Hegel that Popper
so vehemently condemns. That is to say, from a Popperian perspec:tive,
Deleuze's ideas would lead us not to the kind of leftist politics of
difference that Deleuze is usually associated with, but rather to a
totalizing and totalitarian politics of the sort Deleuze is so often at
pains to critique. At the heart of this divergence is Popper's critique of
irrationalism (and bis corresponding defense of rationalism) and bis
identification of Henri Bergson as one of irrationalism's Hegelian
avatars: if Popper is correct about Bergson, much of the weight of
Popper's critique also falls on Deleuze, by virtue of the foundational
role Bergsonian ideas have for bis philosophy: Deleuze, on the other
hand, finds in Bergson's ideas a means to critique and even to 'escape'
Hegel.6 I think that Popper's defense of rationalism is important and
valid, but I also think: he is wrong about Bergson (and by inference,
Deleuze). Moreover, the basis on wbich he criticizes Bergson seerrLS to
me very close to some of Bergson's (and Deleuze's) own eore
propositions, most specifically in relation to the ontological operuless
and creativity of Being. This doesn't make Popper a Bergsonian (or
Deleuze a Popperian). It does, however, suggest that exploring the




Why Irrationalism Tends Towards Totalitarianism (and
Rationalism Doesn't)
In a sense the interpretation of Bergson is peripheral to The
Open Sode!) and Its Enemies-he gets a handful of brief mentions in
several hundred pages devoted mainly to Hegel and Marx? At the
heart of Popper's dispute with Hegel and those whom he sees as Hegel's
inheritors is, rather, the conflict between rationalism and irrationalism
as modes of thought and of engagement the world, a conflict wbich,
he says, "has become the most important intellectual, and perhaps
even moral, issue of our time."B In simple terms, Popper's argument is
that irrationalism leads to dogmatism and absolutism in ideas, and from
there to totalitarianism in Politics.
Popper's attack on irrationalist philosophy and the "enemies
of the open society" is a corollary of bis conception of rationalism as
a commitment to the possibility and the practice of ongoing critique.
In essence, he aligns "the rationalist attitude" with the possibility of
reasoned argument between individuals. It is, as he puts it, "an attitude
of readiness to listen to critical arguments and to learn from experience.
It is fundamentally an attitude of admitting that '1 may be wrong andyou
mqy be rightj and l!J an eJfor!, we mayget nearer the truth."'9 This conception
of rationalism is in effect a generalisation to socia!, political and moral
realms oE the model of the scientific method that he proposes in The
Logic of Sdentiflc Discovery. The scientific method, in Popper's terms,
subsists in the posing of hypotheses, wbich are then subject to attempts
at refutation or falsification. These are either rejected or revised on the
basis such testing, or, if they survive, lead to a kind of provisional
acceptance. The more attempts at falsification an hypothesis stands up
to, the more likely it is to be an accurate model of: or statement about,
the real world, at least until a better one is found-although it can
never be taken to be definitively true as such, merely "not yet falsified."
That is to say, it remains permanently open to possible refutation.
Popper's rationalism generalises this by requiring that a'!Y statement or
claim (not only those that lay claim to the status of science) must be
open to argument and critique by others, whose claims and arguments
are in turn equally open to questioning. Rationality thus lies neither in
the content of a statement, orin the qualities or faculties of an individual,
but rather in the process of "testing" itselE In this sense, "reason, like
language, can be said to be a product of sociallife."lO It is the process
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of challenging by individuals of each other's ideas that constitutes the
provisional validity of any position, and wbich establishes what he
describes as "the 'rational unity of mankind."'ll
It is important to note here that the 'unity' Popper is referring
to is not a unity of agreed beliefs reached through discussion, but
rather a unity of commitment to the rational process of the ongoing
challenging of beliefs, in which "we must recognize everybody with
whom we communicate as a potential source of argument and
reasonable information."12 A consensus model would be far too
Hegelian, reducing reason to a kind of "collectivism," "a kind of
departn1ent of the soul or spirit of society (for example, of the nation,
or the class)."13 Reason is, for him, a product of inter-personal, and
never collective, discussion or consensus.14 By the same token, ne.ither
are we rational as individuals (we are not rational by right orby necessity),
since it is the process of testing and challenging that gives rationali·lty its
reason. Rationalism is, for Popper, fundamentally a position of
"intellectual modesty" that acknowledges the limitations and errors of
our individual knowledge and understanding, and the necessity of an
engagement with others who will test and contest our ideas. Such
contestation cannot lead us to eertainty. It may, however, improve our
ideas, and prevent them from falling into dogmatism: "argument rarely
settles a question, although it is the only means for learning-not to
see clearly, but to see more clearly than before."15
This is, in effect, the heart of bis critique of irrationalism, and
of his association of it with totalising and totalitarian political
formations. Because irrationalism offers no basis for the critique or
contestation of ideas-no basis for reasoned rejection or (provisional)
acceptance-it tends necessarily towards dogmatism: "where there is
no argument, nothing is left but full acceptance or flat denial."16
Moreover, having abandoned argument as a basis for thought, "it rnust
nearly always ...produce an attitude which considers the person of the
thinker instead of his thought. It must produce the belief that 'we
thinkwith our blood,' or 'with our national heritage,' or 'with our class." '17
Such a break divides humanity into friends and foes,
into the few who stand near, and the many who stand far;
into those who speak the untrall.slatable language of our
emotions and passions and those whose tongue is not
our tongue. Onee we have done this, politieal
equalitarianism beeomes praetieally impossible.18
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Popper's reference to "equalitarianism" points us towards the
heart of the issue: what is at stake in the tension between rationalism
and irrationalism is not truth, or even the elimination of falsity, but
rather morali~or more precisely, the limitation of immorality. Subjecting
one's ideas and claims to rational criticism does not of necessi!J make
them better (though it may), or even more likely to be true (especially
given thatwhat is often at stake in the soci~political and moral realms-
the statements that must remain open to criticism-are precisely
questions about what is "better" or "true"). No matter how much
rational criticism an idea or proposal is opened to, it may still lead to
negative consequences for some or for all (and in that sense may show
itself to have been at the very least a flawed idea.) Rational criticism
may reduce the chances of going wrong (by "testing" the options
conceptually rather than practically), but the only necessary outcome of
a rationalist approach is a limitation on absolute claims, inasmuch as it
at least requires one to listen to the arguments of others, since, as
Popper says, "they might be right, and you might be wrong."
Rationalism is therefore bound up with the idea that the
other fellow has a right to be heard, and to defend bis
arguments. It thus implies the recognition of a claim to
tolerance, at least of all those who are not intolerant
themselves. One does not kill a man when one adopts the
attitude of first listening to bis arguments.19
If one holds ideas irrationally and dogmatically, on the other hand, the
arguments and claims of those who hold different ideas become
irrelevant, as do the needs and desires that arise from them. In other
words, the other person becomes a mere tool whose potential suffering
is secondary to the dictates of your irrational beliefs, irrespective of
their own: they become an object to be used or thrown away in the
service of the absolute and undeniable faith that drives you. This is the
immorality that Popper's rationalism seeks to limite
Why Popper is Right about Bergson
Popper's identification of Bergson with Hegelianism,
irrationalism, and ultimately with totalitarianism and fascism is both
right and wrong. It is wrong inasmuch as Popper fundamentally
misinterprets certain key Bergsonian ideas, and thus ends up with a
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distorted understanding of Bergson's philosophical position, some
elements of which are in fact very close to the ideas that Popper draws
on to attack Hegel and the "Hegelian" Bergson. It is right in the sense
that, historically speaking, the political impact of Bergson's ideas has,
in some areas, been precisely as Popper claims.20 However, as I will
argue, the policical appropriations of Bergson's ideas that Popper holds
him responsible for are the result of amisinterpretation of certain key
aspects of those ideas. Moreover, Popper's interpretation of Bergson
suffers precisely the same misconceptions.
We can start to justify these claims by looking at the historical
influence of Bergson's ideas in the political realm. This is a rather
complex web to try and unravel-his ideas were praised and vilified by
different elements from both the right and left of French politics
throughout his life.21 However, inasmuch as Bergsonian philosophy
has been nominated as a theoretical and ideological influence upon
actual political practices by its practitioners, that politics has often been
in varying degrees nationalist, anti-liberal, anti-democratic, quasi or even
just plain fascist in orientation.22 That is to say, far from being associated
with pluralism of any sort, in practice the political influence of
Bergsonism has been most strongly feit in totalising and totalitarian
formations of one kind or another (although the specific nature of
that influence differs with the grouping one examines). The key figure
here is Georges Sorel, the French pre-war anarcho-syndicalist leader
and philosopher, admired for his "anti-intellectualism...his dislike of
Kant, his Bergsonism, and his contempt for bourgeois and liberalvalues,
democracy, and parliamentarianism."23.
Sorel was described by Georges Valois24 (himself a key figure in
the French fascist movements of the 1920s) as "the intellectual father
of fascism."25 Sorel regularly attended Bergson's lectures at the C'Jllege
de France, and was quite explicit that he considered his work to be a
practical application of Bergsonian philosophical principles to the world
of political action.26 Furthermore, he wrote extensivelyon Bergson,27
and his most famous work, ReJlections on Violence,28 published the year
after Creative Evolution, "was immediately compared with Bergson's
theories of life and vitality," so much so that he was described at the
time as being a disciple of Bergson.29 Neither was Sorel's influence on
fascist thinking limited to France. Benito Mussolini is reported to have
quipped, "Everything I am, I owe to Sorel,"30 and Charles EDelzell
specifically includes Bergson's emphasis on the role of intuition and
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the creative power of elan vital among the pre-war currents of
philosophical and political thought that contributed the development
of Italian Fascism.31
There are two key Bergsonian themes that seem to have been
taken up by Sorel specifically, but also by diverse groupings on the
extreme left and right of French politics in the pre and inter-war period,
as both models o~ and justifications for, political action.32 Firstly, the
critique of the limits of scientific or mechanistic thought in terms of
its inability to grasp real movement, and Bergson's corresponding
correction in terms of the intuition of duration; secondly, the emphasis
on the notion of creative evolution as unceasing change. Bergson in
fact is quite explicit that he by no means dismisses science, nor seeks to
devalue it. Instead, he seeks to make "a clear distinction between
metaphysics and science. But at the same time we attribute an equal
value to both."33 Rather than attacking or rejecring science and
mechanistic approaches to understanding, he understands them limited,
or rather, as operative only within the confines of an arbitrarily closed
whole, and considers his metaphysics as simply the attempt to restore
real duration to the spatialized time of science and mathematics.34 For
Sorel and others at the time, however, this appears to have been
interpreted as a critique of all rational thought as such, and linked to
the critique of materialism and Enlightenment values that Zeev
Sternhell identifies as a key unifying theme across the fascist and quasi-
fascist groups in question.35 Moreover, Bergson's emphasis on the
method of intuition was taken as justifying the place of the irrational
within political thought and action, especially in terms of spontaneous
(revolutionary) action and the mobilising power of social myth, Sorel's
favourite myth being that of the ''Total Strike."36 Thus Gilbert Maire,
a member of the Sorelian nationalist right grouping organised around
the Cahiers du Cercle Proudhon, argued that "Sorel's method...derived
from a Bergsonian anti-intellectualism that recognised the limitations
of abstract or logical reasoning. The theory of myths and the
concomitant theory of violence were both products of this method."3?
In conjunction with the emphasis on an "irrationalist" concept
of intuition, the Sorelian interpretation also takes up Bergson's theories
on creative evolution as further justification for the role of violent
change in politicallife. I<.ennedy argues that, for Sorel,
"creativity is a spontaneous expression of seIfe
Furthermore, the creative energy of society is necessarily
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violent; civilizations depend on the dynamism of their
dominant classes and when those cease providing new
ideas and inventions, their civilizatiol1s begin to decline."38
Such an interpretation of Bergson appears to read the creation of the new
in terms of the destruction of the old, so that, for Sorel, "Bergson's
intuition, being a direct insight into creative evolution, could also be
used to provide a philosophical justification for revolution."39 Sternhell
points out that
Sorel referred to Bergson's Donnees immediates de Ja conscience
[Time and Free Wil~ at length to show that 'movement is
the main element in the life of the emotions,' and it is 'in
terms of movement that one should speak of creative
consciousness.' [Thus for Sorel] the idea of class sttuggle
fulflls this function of promoting movement; it is in fact
a myth aiming at the maintenance of astate of continuous
tension, scission, and catastrophe, astate of covert war, a
daily moral struggle against the established order.4O
In this way the Bergsonian intuition of duration as creation is
transliterated into Sorelian revolutionary violence, to the point that
"Julien Benda, one of Bergson's most critical contemporaries,
understood bis philosophy as encouraging social instability through a
blindly irrational approval of change for its own sake."41
Where Soret and Popper Go Wrong
Itis difficult to reconcile the Sorelian appropriation ofBergson
with what we know of Bergson's own political leanings. Certainly,
according to IZennedy, Bergson "was not enthusiastic about Sorel and
certainly took no part in the syndicalist or socialist movements of pre-
war France."42 Moreover, far from being anti-democratic in orientation,
or a proponent of revolutionary violence, he was an advocate of and
participant in the internationalism of th.e League of Nations.43 At one
point at least, he even links Hegelian philosophy to German militarism
in a manner similar to Popper.44 And certainly the political implications
the Sorelians draw from Bergson's work seem starkly at odds with the




So where did the Sorelians go wrong? We can start to unpack
the problem by looking at the relation between Bergson's concept of
"creative evolution:' and the rise of what one might call "evolutionary
thought" in the latter half of the nineteenth cent:ur}T. Popper's critiques
of what he calls "historicism," and of its mlsappropriation of
evolutionary theory have some relevance here.46 He uses the term to
refer to theories of social history that seek or lay claim to predictive
value. Historicism, in this sense, predates Darwin (he includes
Hegelianism in this catego~ and indeed traces it as far back as Heraclitus
and Plato).47 However, he argues that historicist social and political
theory from the mid-nineteenth century onwards latched on to various
misinterpretations of Darwin's evolutionary hypothesis as predictive
(a unlversallaw), rather than descriptive (an account how specific species
arrived at their current form), so far as to define their task as the laying
bare of "the lawof evolution of sode!] in order to foretell its future."48
Thus, when I speak of the development of "evolutionary thought"
from the mid-nineteenth century onwards, I have in mind here not
only the impact of Darwinism, or more strictly Spencerian social
Darwinism, but also its convergence with various tendencies to think
of change or progress in terms of conflict (often specifically violent
conflict) and a correlative valuation of willas the driving force of such
change. This convergence does not so much constitute a coherent
philosophical position as it represents the cultural influence of aseries
of diverse and sometimes conflicting strands of thought which would
include not only Darwin, but also Hegel, Marx, Schopenhauer,
Nietzsche and Herbert Spencer alongside Bergson.
This tendency to conceive of change (or evolution) in terms
of conJlict can be traced in part from Hegel through to Marx, and then
to the fascist attempt to "transcend socialism." In Marx, the Hegelian
dialectic becomes dialectical materialism, driven by class war explained
in economic terms, while Sorelian influenced fascism in turn aims to
"transcend" socialism by unlfying the proletariat and the bourgeoisie
under the banner of nationalism, and conceives of "evolution" in terms
of the an essentially dialectical conflict of nations rather than classes.
Prom this perspective, the adoption of Bergsonian creative evolution
as an explicit theoretical influence by Sorelian fascism can be understood
in terms of the conflation of Bergsonism with an implicitly Hegelian
conception of evolutionary development as violent conflict, or negation
as war. Indeed, accorcling to JackJ. Roth, Sorel
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saw a great similarity between Hegel and Bergson...both
considered abstract understanding and discursive
intelligence to touch only the surface of the real; they
both had qualitative and dynamic conceptions of the spirit;
and they were one in negating the substantialism and
atomism which would isolate and fix the moments of the
life of the spirit.49
Popper, in bis turn, presents the dialectic as a form of creative evolution:
We can say that Hegel's world of flux is in astate of
'emergent' or 'creative evolution'; each of its stages
contains the preceding ones, from which it originates; and
each stage supersedes all previous stages, approaching
nearer and nearer perfeetion.50
In this way Bergsonism is linked to the Hegelian roots of twentieth-
century totalitarian political practice that Popper identifies in The Open
Society and fis Enemies.
At the same time, however, Popper also gives us the key to
understanding the disjunction between "Bergsonian" fascism and
Bergson's own apparent political leanings. Popper identifies Hegel's
dialectical theory of bistorical development as essentially evolutionist
(in the bistoricist, rather than properly Darwinian, sense), and as a
corollary, any evolutionist theory as essentially Hegelian and dialectical-
hence his reading of Bergson's concept of creative evolution as
fundamentally Hegelian.51 Moreover he explicitly classifies both the
extreme left (whom he identifies with Marxism) and the extreme right
(whom he identifies with fascism per se) as having fundamentally
dialectical conceptions of political "evolution": "the leftwing replaces
the war of nations wbich appears in Hegel's bistoricist scheme by the
war of classes, the extreme right by the war of races; both follow him
more or less consciously."52 Indeed, if Popper's analysis is correct,
fascism's conflation of race, land and nation reconfigures the class
conflict of socialism as a conflict between nations, and in doing so has
in fact returned to its Hegelian roots. Such an approach conceives of
evolution as a teleological model of bistorical development (history as
progress), wbich Popper dismissively sums up as "Hegel's hysterical
bistoricism... the fertilizer to wbich modern totalitarianism owes its
rapid growth."53. Thus for him,
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Tbe transubstantiation oE Hegelianism into racialism or
oE Spirit into Blood [in EascismJ does not greatly alter the
main tendency oE Hegelianism. It only gives it a ringe oE
biology and oE modern evolutionism. The outcome is a
materialistic and at the same time mystical religion oE a
selE-developing biological essence, very closely reminiscent
oE the religion oE reative evolution (whose prophet was
the Hegelian Bergson).54
The key slippage that allows Sorel and the Sorelians to
appropriate Bergson's ideas in the service of violent revolution and
totalising political ends takes place, I would argue, in their misconception
of the organism in relation to Bergson's creative evolution (a
misconception that Popper's understanding of Bergson shares.) If one
looks at Sorel's application of the notion of "creative evolution" to
class conflict, or the properly fascist application of Sorel's ideas to the
conflict of races and nations, the organic metaphor is being applied to
distinct individuals (mdividual classes, individual races, individual nations
seen as organicunities) involved in what is conceived of as an evolutionary
battle for "the survival of the fittest," to use Herbert Spencer's phrase.55
That is to say, their conception of evolutionary adaptation ultimately
treats the organism as something separate and distinct from its
environment, rather than continuous with it, and thereby thinks the
continuous movement of evolution (adaptation) on the basis of static
points. It therefore operates on the basis of the determined identity of
either species/class/nation taken as "closed systems simply subjected
to external forces and determinations"; in other words, it treats the
organism as a closed whole.56 To put it bluntly, in their thinking about
creative evolution, though theywere reading Bergson, theywere thinking
Spencer, and what this leads them to is a de-facto Hegelianism.57
This con±1ation of Bergson and Hegel (by both Popper and
the Sorelians) requires a substantial misreading of Bergson, who in
fact argues that change in the organism (evolutionary "movement'')
expresses itself in and through a continuity of change in relations with
its environment, of the ways in which they interact, in both directions.
That is, any change in relations between aspects of the whole expresses
itself in the transformation of the whole in its entirety.58 Thus, as
Deleuze points out, the organism can only be taken as analogous to
the whole to the extent that both are open.59 In essence, the Sorelians'
(and Popper's) mistake is to conceive of creative evolution as something
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wbich is expressed in the organism/species/ class/ nation-evolution
as action upon closed, self-identical, actual entities-when it is more
properly understood as something manifested only in terms of the
continuous transformation of a stricdy vittual whole, of wbich the
organism is only an open and "mobile section," to use Deleuze's
terminology.60
Where Popper and Bergson Agree
The danger Popper seeks to avert in bis critique of irrationalist
and historicist predictions lies in the acts that are justified on their
behalf. As Popper puts it,
If you kno~ on the basis of historical prophecy; what the
result of the social revolution must be, and if you know
that the result is all that we hope for, then, but only then,
can you consider the revolution with its untold suffering
as a means to the end of untold happiness. But with the
elimination of the historieist doctrine, the theory of
revolution becomes completely untenable.61
If one holds to such prophetic doctrines, then no counterargument
based on the human pain or suffering can sway you, since the end-
the future your doctrine has determined-justifies the means.
Impervious to criticism or evidence, such doctrine is necessarily
irrational. The moral importance of a rationalist approach lays not in
its ability to lead us to the "right" conclusions and actions, but in its
capacity to help us limit the impact of bad conclusions and actions by
subjecting them to criticism. In this sense, rationalism has a stricdy
negative power.
The key issue here-and the point on wbich Popper takes up a
key Bergsonian position-is the necessary openness and
unpredictability of the future. Bergson criticises both teleological and
mechanistic philosophies for treating the "future and past as calculable
functions of the present, and thus claim[mg] that allisgiven."62 Inasmuch
as the whole is given (either in relation to a pre-given goal, or as causally
determined by its starting conditions and laws), there can be no real
change, no production of the new or unforeseeable, since every moment
is in some sense "given in advance." That is to say, for Bergson, both
teleological and mechanistic determinism treat the whole as closed.
Deleuze summarizes Bergson's position this way:
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The confusion of space and time, the assimilation of time
into space, make us think that the whole is given, even if
only in principle, even if only in the eyes of God. And
this is the mistake that is common to mechanism and to
fmalism [teleology]. The former assumes that everything
is calculable in terms of astate; the latter, that everything
is determinable in terms of a program: In any event, time
is only there now as a screen that hides the eternal from
us, or show ussuccessively what a God or superhuman
intelligence would see in a single glance.63
Popper's critique of historicism reaches very similar conclusions,
with regard to both teleological modes of propheey (for which Hegel
provides his example) and causally determinist ones (which is how he
characterises Marxian economic determinism): they treat the future as
closed, as if all were given in advance.
This similarity seems to me more than superficial or accidental.
Popper notes that, in The Poverty of Historicism, he "only tried to show
that historicism is a poor method; I did not try to refute it."64 In The
Open Universe, he takes up the task of refuting not only historicism, but
also deterministic prediction in all forms, including that of science.
His arguments (which are too lengthy to summarize here) ahn to refute
determinism by showing that, although the past is determined, the
future is necessarily undeterIDined and thus open.65 In doing so, he
comes to a characterisation of science that seems to me very close to
Bergson's. While Bergson attacks both teleological and mechanistic
manners of conceiving of the whole, of the universe, as given in
advance, he by no means dismisses science, or the value of its findings.
Rather, he sees science as dealing onlywith limited or closed "sets" (to
use Deleuze's terminology), artificially abstracted from the openness
of the whole by spatialising duration-thus treating change in time as
equivalent to translation in space. He argues that this spatialising
tendency is a necessary function of thought, perception and language,
insofar as these are tools for abstracting or isolating something to act
on from the unbroken continuity of change that he argues characterises
real duration. This is the "cinematographic illusion:"66 in which
we take snapshots, as it were, of the passing reality; and,
as these are characteristic of the reality, we have only to
string them on a becoming, abstract, uniform and invis-
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ible, situated at the back of the apparatus of knowledge
in order to imitate that which is characteristic of this be-
coming itself.67
This illusion is a pragmatic one, and one that is common to all
life, inasmuch life is thatwhich acts. Reali~ for Bergson, is continuous
change (that is to say, duration), but in order to act, life must perforce
"cut out" static points from this continuity in order to act upon them:
Our needs are, then, so many searchlights which, directed
upon the continuity of sensible qualities, single out in it
distinct bodies. They cannot satisfy themselves except
upon the condition that they carve out, within this
continuity, a bodywhich is to be their own and then delimit
other bodies with which the first can enter into relation,
as if with persons. To establish these special relations
among portions thus carved out from sensible reality is
just what we call1iving.68
The closed and limited systems that characterise the objects of
science are cut out in precisely this manner, and are no more "false"
than the bodies and objects we delimit for ourselves in order to act in
the world. Such systems, or sets, or bodies serve a pragmatic and
necessary function, but cannot provide an adequate characterisation
of the whole as such: ''The real whole might weil be, we conceive, an
indivisible continuity. The systems we cut out within it would, properly
speaking, not then be parts at all; they would be partial views of the
whole."69 But if we mistake these "partial views" for "parts"-if we
take our spatialised abstraction of reality for reality itself-we fall into
the trap of thinking that the predictions we make successfully with
regard to closed systems can be extended to the open whole as such.
This is the error of positivist determinism, the error of regarding the
whole as giveable in advance, even if only in principle.
This conception of science as dealing onlywith closed or limited
systems-but never with reality as a whole-is very close indeed to
what Popper has to say about science and its limits. He argues that
the method of science depends upon our attempts to
describe the world with simple theories: theories that are
complex may become untestable, even if they happen to
be ttue. Science may be described as the art of systematic
over-simplification-the art of discerning what we may
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with advantage omit....Our attempt to describe the world
in terms oE universal theories may be an attempt to
rationalize the unique, the irrational, in terms oE our selE-
made universalIaws...each step oE approximation seems
to describe a partial aspect oE the world without which
we could not understand the next.70
This notion of science as "the art of discerning what we may with
advantage omit" corresponds closely with Bergson's treatment of
science as that which deals with limited or closed systems. The
"simplification" that science performs is not merely omission, but
omission to our advantage, omission that gives us greater power to act
upon the world by virtue of our (limited) models of it. Popper describes
scientific theories as "nets designed by us to catch the world."71 In
testing those theories (through attempts at falsification), we may get
better nets, "yet they will never be perfect instruments to catch our
fish, the real world. They are rational nets of our own making, and
should not be mistaken for a complete representation of the real world
in all its aspects.,,72 Testing for falsification may lead to better theories,
but those theories will never be fine enough nets to capture all of
reality. To put it another way, it is possible to improve the pragmatic
usefulness of our theories-to increase our power to act upon the
world-but we cannot in principle or in fact devise theories which
captur'e the whole, precisely as a funct:ion oE its openness to the future.
This openness, then, is fundamental to Popper's conception of science,
and scientific methodology (and its limits); to his arguments in favour
oE rationalism and its role in limiting immorality; to his critique of
Hegelian evolutionary historicism, and thus to his implicit attack on
Bergsonian philosophy as a variation on that Hegelian historicism. And
that same openness is one of the fundamental tenets of Bergsonian
philosophy.73
Why Popper is Not Bergson.
Of course, Bergson and Popper's shared commitment to the
openness of the future does not commit the latter to the former's
proposal that it is duration as such that escapes our nets. Although a full
analysis of the divergence of their philosophical approaches belongs
elsewhere, I would contend that the key point of difference lies in their
analysis of the relations between past, present and future. Despite the
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fact that Popper finds it "crucially important to distinguish between
the determinedpastand the openjuture;'74 he has nothing to sayabout
how it is that the future becomes the past, how the undetermined
becomes determined.75 That is to say, Popper does not deal with the
present as such, with the mobile point at which past and future meet.
Bergson's treatment of duration,memo~ the nature of the openwhole,
on the other hand, are fundamentally entwined with his analysis of the
paradoxical relation of the present to both past and future. As he
points out, "no·thing is less than the present moment, if you understand
by that the indivisible limit which divides the past and future. When we
think this present as going to be, it exists not yet, and when we think it
as existing, it is already past."76 In particular, problems arise when we
consider how it is that the present becomes the past. If present and
past are different in kind (which would be a "commonsense" position),
then there is no way for the present to pass, to become past, and
duration ceases to be real (time stops). It: on the other hand, present
and past are continuous and undivided, the present is always and already
'in the past' at the very moment it is present. I would argue that much
of what is so foreign and alien in Bergson's work to a Popperian
perspective---despite their shared commitment to the openness oE
the future-arises out of Bergson's analysis of these paradoxes of the
present.
Despite this key divergence, given their belief in the openness
of the future that they share, the question arises of whether there is a
sense in which Bergson and Popper's respective philosophies might
be said to at least overlap, or complement each other. Although Popper
gives metaphysical speculation (such as Bergson's) no particular value
in its own right, he does note in Conjectures andReJUtations that it can play
a productive role within a strictly scientific and rational methodology,
although this is by no means necessary or inevitable. Within his
framework, the "scientificity" or "rationality" of hypotheses or
statements does not derive from their content, but rather from the
processof falsification or critique one subjects them to. Even metaphysical
statements can playavalid part in this process, to the extent that they
prompt the investigation of other, genuinely testable and falsifiable
hypotheses.77 Given that Bergson sees science and metaphysics merely
as "two opposed although complementaryways of knowing;'78 it might
be tempting, then to see his "intuition" simplyas a means of inventing
new metaphysical statements, or "myths" that might prompt new
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directions for properly rational or scientific critique and testing.
However, such a proposal would be deeply flawed, even on Bergson's
terms. Even if we allow the intuitive grasp of real duration that Bergson
proposes as a given, by his own argument there is no way for any such
intuition to be communicated without spatialising its grasp of real
duration. As he points out, "whether we would think becoming [that is
to say; durationJ, or express it, or even perceive it, we hardly do anything
else than set going a kind of cinematograph inside us ... the mechanism
of our orclinary knowledge is of a cinematographical kind."79 If this is
the case, then any attempt to think about the duration one grasps
intuitively-Iet alone communicate it-will of necessity turn it into a
spatialized reduction of itself. No matter what metaphorical or poetic
resources one is able to drawon to communicate one's intuitive insight
to someone else, that act of communication will always take place in
language, and thus always be "cinernatographie" in nature. Intuitive
insight can thus never become "raw materials" for rational critique or
science, because thry can never be communicated, even as "myth."
It seems worth pointingout at this point that Popper's distinetion
between "rational" and "irrational" does not coincide completely with
Bergson's distinetion between "intuition" and the "cinernatographie"
products of language, thought and perception. Clearly, for Popper,
language can say many irrational things, as weil as being used for rational
discussion, but for Bergson, language can say nothing of intuitions at
alle As a result, any irrationally (that is to say, dogmatically) held belief,
philosophy, claim, or statement may certainly be subject to Popper's
criticisms-but any intuition of real duration as Bergson dejines it, is not,
and cannot be, subject to the same, because whatever an intuition might
be, it cannot be a belief or an idea or a philosophy (since the latter are
all functions of "cinematographic" thought), nor can it be a claim or a
statement, let alone a political program (since they are all dependent
on being expressed in "cinernatographie'" language). 80 In Bergson's
terms, intuition as such must always remain a "private matter." By the
same token, however, it can never be used as the basis for any social or
political action either. This underlines my argument that Popper's
accusation of irrationalism misses its mark with regard to Bergson,
but it also precludes Bergsonian intuition from playit~geven a marginal




This, finally, brings us back to Deleuze. The bulkof my argument
so far has been devoted to showing that Popper's accusation that
Bergson's philosophy is Hegelian, and thus irrationalist, is based on
the false assumption that Bergson's "creative evolution" is a variation
of Hegel's evolutionary historicism. In fact, the premise on which
Popper bases his attack on historicism (that the future is open) is the
very same basis upon which Bergson develops his philosophical
framework (the whole is open). In short, if my argument is convincing,
the weight of Popper's accusation no longer falls onBergson's shoulders,
and as a result it no longer falls on Deleuze's either-at least to the
extent that Deleuze cannot be accused of irrationalism on the basis of
his Bergsonism. However, the quotations with which I began this essay
imply a far more direct way of targeting Deleuze. If rationalism is can
be summarised as a willingness to "sit down and talk it through," then
Deleuze's and Guattari's comment that every philosopher "runs away"
from discussion suggests rather strongly that their conception of
philosophy is one that Popper would not hesitate to call irrational and
dangerous.
Of course, one can always invert the accusation: from Deleuze's
(and Guattari's) perspective, whatever Popper's rationalism is, it is not
philosophy, and those who engage in it are not philosophers. The
reference to philosophers 'running away' from discussion comes in
the context of their definition of philosophy as the creation of
concepts.81 Discussion, or criticism, or agreement, have nothing to do
with philosophy in this sense, because philosophy creates while
discussion or debate can only repeat or negate (Is it right? Is itwrong?).
The Deleuzian philosopher's question is ''What can I do with it? What
new weapons can I make?"82 Even in his work in the history of
philosophy, Deleuze's approach is not to clarify or explain or critique
his subject, but to "give birth to monsters."83 To sit down and talk it
over, to criticize, is to turn philosophy into a contest of "rival opinions
at the dinner table."84 Consensus or argument can only dispute, negate
or limit, and never create: it is a purely negative and reactive conception
of philosophy. As Deleuze puts it, "All these debaters and
communicators are inspired by ressentiment."85
This emphasis on philosophy as creative can certainly be linked
to the ontology of difference, and thus of creativi~that Deleuze takes
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up from Bergson.86 Uke Bergson, he accords science an equal, though
distinct, value to that of philosophy (as a creator of functions, rather
than concepts; art, on the other hand, creates affects.) Thus, as Paul
Patton puts it,
scientific functions refer to bodies and states of affairs
while philosophical statements express pure events. This
implies that philosophy does not provide discursive
knowledge of the kind provided by the sciences. In
particular, it does not provide proof of its claims in a
manner that may be disputed from the standpoint of facts
or even from that of another concept. A philosophical
concept cannot be disproved, it can only be discarded.87
Thus it would seem that, in "running away" from discussion to create,
the Deleuzian philosopher does indeed leave the field that Popper
wishes to claim for rationalit)T, the plane on which science creates its
functions, and camps upon a different territory, a different plane. But
this plane seems to be precisely that which Popper would call that of
irrationalism.
I noted in my introduction that both Deleuze and Popper
share a concern and interest in the political implications and effects of
philosoph)!. As I've suggested, the political significance of rationalism
for Popper has little or nothing to do with any attempt to reach
agreem~ntor consensus. His rationalism is pragmatic, realist and limited,
and aims at a strictly negative relation to politics. That is to say; it
proposes no positive scheme or plan or action, no model of "the
people;' or their rights, beyond that of maximising one's negative
freedom, freedom from the schemes and designs of others. Its only
necessary outcome is the limitation of immorality, by preventing the
dogmatic application of theories or programs of action regardless of
the views of others, and of the harm it may cause them. Deleuze's
conception of the relation of philosophy to politics is rather different.
According to Paul Patton, "Deleuze and Guattari see the invention of
concepts as a means of breakingwith self-evidence"-away; one might
say, of freeing thought from its cinematographic trap.88 A concept
extracts from the actual what they call "the event"; that which is neither
an event-"what happened"-nor the abstract and eternal (platonic)
concept of actual things or states of affairs. The event, as virtual, "is
actualised or effectuated whenever it is inserted, willy-nilly; into astate
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of affairs; but it is counter-eJJectuatedwhenever it is abstracted from states
of affairs so as to isolate its concept."89 Philosophy, as the creator of
concepts, extracts or frees the event from things, the actual, from what
happens: "to the extent that the pure event is each time imprisoned
forever in its actualisation, counter-actualisation liberates it, alwqys for
other times."90 But what has this to do with politics?
Deleuze says of the events of May '68 that "we're told
revolutions go wrong, or produce monsters in their wake: it's an old
idea, no need to wait for Stalin, it was already true of Napoleon, of
Cromwell. To say revolutions turn out badly is to say nothing about
people's revolucionary becoming."91 I would unpack the fmal sentence
of this quote like this: to say that actual revolutions turn out badly is to
say nothing of people's revolutionary becoming, of the revolution as
virtual event, as pure event. To the extent that one is able to counter-
effectuate an actual revolution (Stalin, Napoleon, Cromwell) to find its
concept, one liberates the event from its entrapment in the actual, the
policical, the violent, and the monsters that follo"', in favour 'other
times'. Philosophy understood as the creation of concepts is not
concerned with the attempt to limit the actua/violence and immorality
oE the revolution, and the monsters we suffer in its wake (whichever
revolution it may be)-thatis to say, with the negative but actual freedom
of Popper's rationalism. Rather, it seeks its relation to the political in
the positive creation of the concept, the counter-effectuation of the
virtual event as "the contour, the configuration, the constellation of
an event to come."92 When Deleuze and Guattari thus come to speak
of a "people yet to come" on the final page oE What is Philosopf!y?/3 it
seems to me that this is not a reference to some future (i.e. possible)
social or political organisation, but rather the giving over, here and
no"', of the human to the impossibility of actual community; of just
politics, of humanity, as the condition of community; the unavowable
community; the ethical community. Deleuze flees discussion, critique,
a rationality modelled on the methods of science in order to create
'the constellation of an event to come'-not an event that will come,
not a possible event, but rather the impossibility of the event, the
impossibility of the people, here and now, impossible in the same sense
death is impossible:
Every event is like death, double and in1personal in its
double....'For in it I do not die. I forfeit the power of
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dying. In this abyss they [on] die-they never cease to die,
and they never succeed in dying.'
How different this 'they' is from that which we encounter
in everyday banality. It is the 'they' of impersonal and
pre-individual singularities, the 'they' of the pure event
wherein itdies in the same way that itrains. The splendour
of the 'they' is the splendour of the event itselE94
Popper's Infinite Conversation
It appears that there is no chance of Popper and Deleuze sitting
down to talk. Deleuze's creation, it seems, is Poppers irrationalism.
Popper seeks the limitation of aetualimmorali~ of the actual suffering
of you and I, in a polities of negative freedom. Deleuze's ethics, bis
politics, lies the creation of concepts for the "they" who never cease to
come, and never succeeds in coming. But perhaps, after all, there is a
faint echo of this coming in Popper. Rational discussion is actual, part
of the realm of action, politics, of the violenee it seeks to limit and
forestall in this world. But the founding aet of Popper's rationalism is
precisely the decision at every moment not to kill, not to act, to speak
first, and to keep speaking. Tbis is the only necessary outcome of
rational discussion: to keep speaking, endlessly, infinitely, to extract
from the world oE action a pause in killing, endlessly extended towards
an open future, a time 'yet to come'. The infinite conversation as the
counter-actualisation oE the event of death: not morality (as Popper
says), but as (impossible) ethies in favour, not of an actual humanity
(the monsters in the wake of revolutions), but of a people yet to come.
Of what do you complain, silence without origin? Why
come here to haunt a language that cannot recognize you?
What draws you among us, into this space where the
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